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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
would seem that under the authorities, assuming that a safe place to
work in and safe appliances to work with, are furnished by the master,
a stevedore cannot recover for an injury caused by the negligence
of a fellow servant, even though the negligence which causes the
injury is the failure of one of his co-workers to give a warning
signal that is customary in that business.
Fred R. Boynton.
WHEN MAY AN ULTRA VIRES CONTRACT BE ENFORCED IN
WASHINGTON ?-Under the early common law, an ultra vires con-
tract of a private corporation was absolutely void, on the theory that
there being no power to make such a contract, legally there was no con-
tract. It is at the present time well established in practically all
jurisdictions that neither an action at law nor in equity can be main-
tained either by or against a corporation on an ultra vzres contract
which remains executory as to both parties or has been only partially
performed, even though unanimously ratified by the board and stock
holders.1 It is also well settled that where such a contract has been
fully performed by both parties, the courts will leave them where
they have placed themselves, both being deemed in pan delicto.2
But on the question of the enforceability of a contract which has
been fully or substantially performed by one party but remains execu-
tory as to the other, there is a direct conflict of authority The
United States Supreme Court and other federal courts, England, and
a few of the states adhere strictly to the early rule that an ultra vires
contract is void per se for lack of power to make the same, and con-
sequently that no rights can be acquired thereunder, by performance,
estoppel, or otherwise.3  This is, as a matter of technical theory, the
most logical rule, although not necessarily the most just. Such courts,
however, frequently seek to prevent an injustice by allowing a recov-
ery by the party who has performed, for the reasonable value of the
benefits actually conferred upon the other in money, property, or
services, not upon the express contract but in disaffirmance of the
contract, upon the theory of a quasi contract implied by law to avoid
unjust enrichment of the defendant.
A greater number of the State courts follow the "state rule" that
an ultra vires contract is not strictly void but merely voidable, that
'3 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. 0594, §1530; 14a C. J. 317 7 R. C. L. 675.
"3 FLETCHER Cyc. CORP. 2655, §1585; 14a C. J. 319.
'Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24, 35
L. Ed. 55, 11 Sup. Ct. 478 (1890) Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis By. Co.
v. Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co., 131 U. S. 371, 33 L. Ed. 157, 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 770 (1889) Louisville, New Albany k Chicago Ry. Co. v. Louisville Trust
Co., 171 U. S. 552, 43 L. Ed. 1081, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 817 (1899). The following
states adhere more or less closely to the federal rule: Alabama, Illinois, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee
and Vermont. See also 3 FLETCHER Cyc. COR. 2600, §1539- 14a C. J. 319- 7
R. C. L. 678.
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it does not involve an utter lack of power on the part of the cor-
poration but is rather in the nature of an illegal contract prohibited
either expressly or impliedly by law, that ultra vires means not that
the corporation could not but that it ought not to have made such
contract, and consequently that the party who has not performed may
be estopped to exercise the right which he would otherwise have to
set up the defense of ultra vires in an action on the contract.
In Washington, ultra vires contracts, other than conveyances of
real estate,5 have never been expressly denominated "voidable" rather
than void by our Supreme Court, and the language used in some of
the earlier cases indicates that such contracts are deemed void." Our
Court has never recognized the technical distinction drawn by some of
the courts adhering to the "state rule" between capacity and right;
that is, the idea that ultra vires means not that the corporation utterly
lacks power to make the contract but that it has no legal right and
ought not to do so.
However, the other phase of the "state rule"-the applicability of
the doctrine of estoppel-has become well established in this State.
"The doctrine of ultra vires as a defense has died so hard that it is
well to repeat the proposition which seems to be fully established by
the more recent decisions, that where a contract has in good faith
been fully performed either by the corporation or the other party, the
one who has thus received the benefit will not be permitted to resist
its enforcement by the plea of mere want of power. ' 7  This
just rule was first recognized m this state in the 4th Washington
in 1892, and has been consistently followed since that time. In fact,
generally speaking, the Washington cases may for the most part be
divided into two groups: (1) those holding that the non-performing
party is estopped to set up ultra vires as a defense, in view of the
benefits received by him through the performance by the other party;8
'FLETCHER CYC. Coap. 2609, §1543; 14a C. J. 319, 7 R. C. L. 680.
'Puget Sound National Bank v. Fisher, 52 Wash. 246, 2349, 100 Pac. 724
(1909) Milton v. Crawford, 65 Wash. 145, 118 Pac. 32 (1911), Latshaw v.
Western Townsito Co., 91 Wash. 575, 158 Pac. 248 (1916).
STootle v. First National Bank, 6 Wash. 181, 33 Pac. 345 (1893), Washing-
ton Mill Co. v. Sprague Liumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 5 Pac. 1067 (1898), Spo-
kane v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor, 2 Wash. 17, 60 Pac. 141 (1900),
State ex rel Spring Water Co. v. Monroe, 40 Wash. 54, 82 Pac. 888 (1905),
Olsen v. Northern Steamship Co., 70 Wash. 493, 127 Pac. 112 (1912).
'Tootle v. First National Bank, 6 Wash. 181, 183, 33 Pac. 345 (1893), quot-
ing 2 BEACHT, PRIVATE Coax'., §425.
sCases in which corporation benefited and held estopped: Miller v. Wash-
sngton Southern Ry. Co., 11 Wash. 414, 416, 39 Pac. 673 (1895), Allen v. Olym-
pia Light L Power Co., 13 Wash. 307, 309, 43 Pac. 55 (1895) Wheeler, Osgoode
47 Co. v. Everett Land Co., 14 Wash. 630, 633, 45 Pac. 316 (1896), City of Spo-
kane v. Amsterdamsch Trustees Kantoor, 22 Wash. 172, 180, 60 Pac. 141 (1900),
Blair v. Metropolitan Savings Bank, 27 Wash. 192, 201, 67 Pac. 609 (1902),
Graton ck Knight Mfg. Co. v. Redelshetmer, 28 Wash. 370, 377, 68 Pac. 879
(1902), Knisch v. Inter-State Fisheries Co., 39 Wash. 381, 384, 81 Pac. 855
(1905), Jackson v. Mercantile Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 45 Wash. 244, 246,
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(2) those which, while not denying the general rule, hold that the
facts and circumstances of the particular case are insufficient to create
an estoppel.9
There is still a third small but important group of cases which
go a step further and hold that even though the non-performing
party has received no benefits from the performance by the other
party, yet he will be held estopped to raise such defense, in order to
prevent injustice to the party who has performed in reliance upon
the contract.1" "The doctrine of ultra vires, when invoked for or
against a corporation, should not be allowed to prevail where it would
defeat the ends of justice or work a legal wrong. Railway Co. v.
McCarthy 96 U S. 258. This rule is so well established that it is
the work of supererogation to quote authorities to sustain it.""1
Thus in Creditors Claim & Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan &
Trust CO.,12 it was held that defendant bank could not defend an ac-
tion on its guaranty on the ground of ultra vires, where it telegraphed
a guaranty and then by request wrote a confirmatory letter, stating that
it was secured by a $2000 note, that its telegraphic guaranties were ac-
cepted by other banks, and that the telegram was "a guaranty in fact"
"To hold otherwise, in the light of this record, would be to encourage
fraud and bad faith, and to put the law in the position of awarding
a premium to dishonesty" This rule also may be said to be well settled
in this State, although its applicability will of course depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case.
The attitude of our court is well stated in U S. Fidelity & Guar-
88 Pac. 127 (1907) Puget Sound National Bank v. Fisher 50 Wash. 946, 949
100 Pac. 704 (1909) Sesnon v. Lindeberg, 66 Wash. 1, 7, 118 Pac. 900 (1911)
Union Savings - Trust Co. v. Krumm, 88 Wash. 90, 07, 150 Pac. 681 (1915)
Flanagan v. American Minerals Producing Co., 108 Wash. 569, 579, 185 Pac.
609 (1919) Moore v. American Savings Bank -' Trust Co., 111 Wash. 148, 161,
189 Pac. 1010 (1990). Also Korn v. Spokane 4- Eastern Trust Co., 276 Fed. 68,
71 (C. C. A., 9th Ct., 1991) Equitable Trust Co. v. Washington-Idaho Light 4.
Power Co., 300 Fed. 601, 614 (Dist. Ct., Judge Webster, 1994).
Cases in which other party benefited and held estopped: Hall 8y Paulson
Furniture Co. v. Wilbur 4 Wash. 644, 649, 30 Pac. 665 (1899) Tootle v. First
National Bank, supra (dictum).
'Washington Mll Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 165, 173, 5-9 Pac.
1067 (1898) Spencer v. Alki, Point Transp. Co., 53 Wash. 77, 85, 101 Pac. 509,
132 Am. St. Rep. 1058 (1909) Mooney v. Mooney Co., 71 Wash. -058, 964, 128
Pac. 95 (1910) Hoffman v. Gottsten Investment Co., 101 Wash. 498, 179 Pac.
573 (1918).
"Frost v. Puget Sound Realty Associates, 57 Wash. 629, 635, 107 Pac. 1029(1910) Creditors Claim Adjustment Co. v. Northwest Loan Trust Co., 81
Wash. 947, 953, 149 Pac. 670, Ann. Cas. 1916D 551, L. R. A. 1917A 737 (1914)
U S. Fidelity 4- Guaranty Co. v. Cascade Construction Co., 106 Wash. 478, 483,
180 Pac. 463 (1919).
"Tootle v. First National Bank, supra.
81 Wash. 247, 953, 149 Pac. 670, Ann. Cas. 1916D 551, L. R. A. 1917A
737 (1914).
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anty Go. v. Cascade Construction Co.,' wherein it was said, referring
to the defense of ultra vires: "We would not be understood as abol-
ishing this defense. We would sustain it in any case where
the transaction is prohibited, illegal, or immoral. We merely wish to
be understood as following no Procrustean rule in such cases, but such
defense must always be considered on the merits in law and fact."
It is contended by some with considerable plausibility that the rule
in Washington as to the legal nature and enforceability of an ultra
vwres contract is technically inconsistent in that in some of the earlier
cases an ultra vires contract is held void, and at the same time it
is held that performance of the void contract by one party gives rise
to certain rights thereunder by way of estoppel. However, such rights
arise primarily not so much from the ultra vires contract as from the
performance thereof and the fact that under the circumstances, either
by reason of the benefits received therefrom by the other party or
otherwise, it is recognized as unjust to allow him to deny the validity
of the contract. Effect is given to the contract under such circum-
stances, not because it is valid, but because the defendant is not
legally permitted to set up such invalidity as a defense. A strict
adherence to the technical abstract rule that an ultra vires contract
is void per se (except as there is resort to recovery upon quasi contract)
frequently operates unfairly, dishonestly, and with manifest injustice.
It is submitted that this is a commendable instance of a departure, in
accordance with the modern tendency of the weight of authority among
the state courts, from a strict interpretation of an old technical theory,
in the direction of rendering the law a more effective instrumentality
for the administration of justice.
Elwood Hutcheson.
PROTECTING REAL ESTATE CONTRACT PURCHASES.-Many as-
signees of the vendors' interests in installment contracts for the sale of
real estate suppose that the recording of the assignment protects them
by giving constructive notice of their rights. The increasing amount
of investment in real estate contracts makes it important to determine
the best method for protecting the assignee.
Our Supreme Court' has said that recording "is purely a creation
of the statute", and since the recording of such assignments is not
provided for by statute it would seem that no constructive notice follows
from recording.
106 Wash. 478, 483, 180 Pac. 463 (1919).
"A contract entered into by a corporation is presumed to be within the cor-
porate powers unless the contrary appears, and the burden of proof is upon the
one who attacks the contract as ultra vtres." Belch v. Big Store Co., 46 Wash.
1, 5, 89 Pac. 174 (1907), citing I CLARK A.N MARSHCASL, PIVATE CORP., §174.
Ultra vtres is a defense not favored in law. U S. Fidelity L. Guaranty Co.
v. Cascade Construction Co., supra.
"Fischer v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 993 (1901).
